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cortex participate in perception of light and dark, orientation, and
so on. Although it seems straightforward that retaining informa-
tion in working memory about a fixation dot, or the location of a
saccade target, may involve activation of regions that participated
in its perception, it is less clear that this is an activated long-term
memory. Suppose subjects are presented with a novel shape to re-
member. It could be argued that elements of the shape (corners,
curves, etc.) are retained by invoking neural representations of
these features learned over time, thus perhaps constituting long-
term memories bound in the current episode into the novel shape.
In the case of five novel shapes, of different colors, the argument
could be similarly made that the content of working memory is a
binding of long-term memories. It seems, however, that there is a
meaningful sense in which the “content” of working memory is
more a binding of features to constitute a new representation than
it is activated long-term memories. In the same vein, the proposi-
tion “John loves Mary” is distinct from the proposition “Mary loves
John,” although the same long-term memory elements may be ac-
tivated by both. What if one has never met John, does not know
which John is being referred to, or has never encountered the
name “John” before? The degree to which the content of working
memory includes activated long-term memory varies, and seman-
tic and episodic associations activated along with the proposition
may vary, but the simple proposition “John loves Mary” can exist
in working memory apart from this extra information. As with
novel shapes, it may be argued that novel information is retained
that does not depend on long-term memories.
The relocation of working memory content from separate
buffers, as proposed by Baddeley (1986), to the neural substrates
specialized for perception of information is an important and nec-
essary step that will help enable the study of how frontal cortex
and attention accomplish that which Ruchkin and his coauthors
term “episodic” bindings. Now that neuroimaging methods per-
mit observation of the actual substrates of memory retention, the
notion that separate regions exist for buffering and for perception
of information could interfere with proper interpretations of neu-
roimaging results, and is no longer tenable. This is especially true
because these buffers were often associated with frontal activity
observed during retention, which more likely is involved in atten-
tional control of working memory, as the authors suggest. Long-
term memory may become activated as meaningful stimuli, such
as words, are retained in working memory, but it is important to
remember that humans are facile at retaining novel information,
and novel, complex bindings of information. In these instances,
the nature of “what is in working memory” transcends the collec-
tion of activated perceptual substrates or long-term memories that
may be active, especially in the context of research on higher cog-
nition.
Some neuroimaging results suggest that, as the representations
bound together in working memory increase in complexity, but
not as memory load increases, more anterior regions of prefrontal
cortex are recruited (Kroger et al. 2002).
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Abstract: Working-memory retention as activated long-term memory fails
to capture orchestrated processing and storage, the hallmark of the con-
cept of working memory. The event-related potential (ERP) data are com-
patible with working memory as a mental workspace that holds and ma-
nipulates information on line, which is distinct from long-term memory,
and deals with the products of activated traces from stored knowledge.
Ruchkin et al. equate working-memory retention systems with
short-term memory. One advantage of the multiple-component
working-memory concept is that it incorporates both on-line pro-
cessing and temporary memory (e.g., Baddeley & Logie 1999), al-
lowing the concept of working memory as a mental workspace
(Logie 1995), rather than as a simple temporary storage device.
The notion of working memory retention systems as comprising a
state of activated long-term memory fails to capture, or to account
for, this concept of orchestrated processing plus storage. A multi-
ple-component working memory, as a mental workspace that is
separate from, but holds and manipulates the products of acti-
vated traces in long-term memory (Logie 1995; 2003), retains the
advantages of offering a testable theory, while accounting for a
wide range of behavioural data, both from experimental manipu-
lations and from neuropsychological dissociations (Della Sala &
Logie 2002).
Ruchkin et al. argue that it is more parsimonious to assume that
short-term memory reflects simply the activation of long-term
memory traces, than to assume a separate, multiple-component
working-memory system. However, the former theory has to make
a wide range of assumptions regarding: the operation of the acti-
vation process, how thresholds are set or adjusted, how non-rele-
vant but activated traces are inhibited, how the temporary bind-
ing process occurs and is maintained with input from different
modalities, how the activated information is manipulated (any-
thing from backward digit recall to generating novel mental im-
ages), and how the novel results of those manipulations are held
on a temporary basis (for detailed discussion, see Logie 2003).
Moreover, a model that explains dual-task interference in terms of
similarity of the codes used for each task sounds dangerously cir-
cular. Suggesting that two tasks interfere because they use similar
codes has some difficulty in making predictions independently of
the experimental outcome (Cocchini et al. 2002). In other words,
assuming that working-memory retention systems and long-term
memory arise from the same conceptual cognitive systems may
well be theoretically sterile.
One feature of experimental research into human cognition
that is all too rarely recognised is the use of a range of cognitive
strategies by participants. Logie et al. (1996) demonstrated that
even very simple immediate serial-ordered recall tasks are prone
to the use of a range of cognitive strategies, both across individu-
als, and within the same individual from one occasion to another,
even if the aggregate data for the sample of participants generate
reliable behavioural phenomena. Indeed, some fMRI data of our
own (Logie et al., in press) have shown that specifically instruct-
ing participants to use subvocal rehearsal results in a relatively nar-
row range of areas of activation, focused on Broca’s area and the
supramarginal gyrus, compared with the much broader network
of activation patterns, including those same areas, reported by
Paulesu et al. (1993). Interpreting precisely what kind of cognitive
function might be employed for any given task requires a very
careful cognitive-task analysis, with independent behavioural evi-
dence to indicate precisely how participants are performing the
tasks. Without this, at best, the activation patterns can be seen as
correlates of how, on average, the participant group performed the
task they were set. This is not necessarily informative about the
cognitive systems that participants may select to meet the re-
quirements of the task in hand. This kind of detailed cognitive-task
analysis is not common in brain imaging studies, and this makes it
very difficult to suggest that a given aggregate pattern of activa-
tion is reflecting any particular cognitive function. The result may
then be a mapping of tasks onto brain structures rather than a
mapping of cognitive functions onto brain organisation. In this
sense, brain activation patterns might be used to confirm a cogni-
tive theory, but they need not constrain that theory.
The bulk of the evidence described by Ruchkin et al. focuses on
the argument that activation of the same brain areas indicates that
the same cognitive function is involved. Specifically, because the
same brain areas are active for tasks that are assumed to require
temporary retention as are involved in activation of stored knowl-
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edge or of previous episodes, then there is no need to postulate
separate short-term and long-term memory systems. However,
different time courses of the task result in different time courses
of the ERP trace, a result that could reflect different modes of op-
eration (and hence, functionally different cognitive functions) of
the same brain structures. Moreover, maintenance of material on
a temporary basis, beyond the end of stimulus presentation, is as-
sociated with activity in the prefrontal areas, as well as in the pos-
terior areas, which have been linked to activation of long-term
memory. As Ruchkin et al. point out, the advantage of word lists
over nonword lists in immediate serial- and free-recall tasks indi-
cates an involvement of semantic information in supporting tem-
porary memory functions. However, there is nothing in the re-
ported ERP data that constrains the interpretation that temporary
retention involves areas of the prefrontal cortex, in addition to
some form of ongoing activation of the recently activated traces in
long-term memory. Temporary memory appears to be associated
with both anterior and posterior areas of activation. This could
suggest that the prefrontal cortex is the seat of temporary mem-
ory, or that both the prefrontal and the posterior activation are re-
quired in such tasks, or that the prefrontal activation reflects the
operation of some form of controlling mechanism that ensures
continued maintenance of long-term memory traces. In all cases,
there is a different network of activation associated with tempo-
rary memory than with long-term memory tasks, even if there is
some overlap in the brain areas involved. At a conceptual level, all
three of these interpretations are quite consistent with working
memory holding the products of activated traces from long-term
memory; they are also consistent with working memory compris-
ing a system that is conceptually quite distinct from long-term
memory.
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Abstract: We challenge Ruchkin et al.’s claim in reducing short-term
memory (STM) to the active part of long-term memory (LTM), by show-
ing that their data cannot rule out the possibility that activation of poste-
rior brain regions could also reflect the contribution of a verbal STM
buffer.
Ruchkin et al. argue that they provide strong evidence for a lex-
ico-semantic contribution to verbal short-term memory (STM)
tasks, by showing greater event-related potential (ERP) activity in
posterior lexico-semantic processing areas (most pronounced in
the vicinity of the central midline scalp) during the retention of
STM lists of five words compared to STM lists of three nonwords.
At an empirical level, we support Ruchkin et al.’s results, as we also
observed very similar data in a recent positron emission tomogra-
phy (PET) study investigating lexicality effects in STM. Collette
et al. (2001) explored the activation of posterior brain areas in both
a STM task (ordered recall of three words vs. three nonwords) and
a control condition (repetition of one word vs. one nonword).
When comparing brain regions activated for words versus non-
words in the STM condition, after accounting for brain regions al-
ready activated when contrasting words and nonwords in the con-
trol condition, we observed greater activation in two posterior
brain regions, the left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) and the left
temporo-parietal junction (BA 39). Our data clearly support the
idea that posterior brain areas play an active role during short-
term retention of words and further complement the data of
Ruchkin et al. by providing a more precise localization of these
brain regions.
However, at a theoretical level, we consider that there might be
an alternative interpretation for the activation of posterior brain
regions during STM processing of words than the interpretation
put forward by Ruchkin et al. They consider that their data sup-
port the position that STM mainly reflects the activated state of
LTM, based on similar activation of posterior brain areas thought
to encode lexico-semantic language knowledge during both sin-
gle-word processing and STM for words, relative to single-non-
word processing and STM for nonwords. This interpretation in-
cludes the implicit assumption that the observed activation of
posterior processing areas exclusively reflects the neural substrate
of lexico-semantic representations encoded in LTM. However, we
think that the results cannot exclude the possibility that the pos-
terior brain areas activated in that study could also reflect the con-
tribution of a STM buffer in addition to activation of lexico-se-
mantic knowledge in LTM. First, the posterior regions encoding
lexico-semantic knowledge and those having a buffer function, al-
though different, could be spatially very close and thus difficult to
distinguish by ERP techniques, which have a relatively poor spa-
tial resolution. Second, the authors compared recall of five words
versus three nonwords in order to achieve a similar level of STM
performance for words and nonwords. However, a similar level of
performance does not guarantee that the requirements of STM
storage capacities are the same in both tasks; it is still possible that
STM load was greater in the word than in the nonword condition,
especially as the words (five items) had to be maintained longer in
STM than the nonwords (three items) before recall. By extension,
this implies that the greater ERP activation observed in posterior
brain regions during STM for words relative to nonwords could
also reflect the activation of a STM buffer, and not only activation
of lexico-semantic knowledge as proposed by the authors. Third,
we recently showed more directly that posterior brain regions
could have a specific STM buffer function for verbal information,
by studying brain activation using PET imaging for verbal STM
performance in three patients that had recovered from Landau-
Kleffner syndrome, a rare epileptic childhood aphasia character-
ized by persistent verbal STM impairments (Majerus et al. 2003a).
The patients were presented lists of four words for immediate se-
rial recall and a control condition (repetition of one word); there
was also a control group of 14 healthy young adults. Two of the pa-
tients showed reduced activation in left and right posterior supe-
rior temporo-parietal areas during the STM condition compared
to the control condition, and they presented, at the same time, im-
paired performance in the STM condition. The third patient
showed increased activation in the right posterior superior tem-
poro-parietal area in the STM condition, while presenting, at the
same time, relatively normal STM performance. These results
suggest that activation of the posterior temporo-parietal area de-
termines very directly the level of performance observed in the
STM condition. Furthermore, as there were no differences in be-
havioural and imaging results between control subjects and the
patients for repetition of single words (control condition), which
required the same amount of activation of lexico-semantic repre-
sentations as the STM condition (repetition of word lists), im-
paired lexico-semantic activation is not likely to account for the
results observed in the STM condition. Finally, in a neuropsycho-
logical study with the same patients, we explored more directly the
relationship between language-processing impairments and ver-
bal STM performance (Majerus et al. 2003b); we showed that all
three patients showed no major impairment at the level of lexico-
semantic representations, using both standard vocabulary tests as
well as more sensitive experimental tasks measuring speed of ac-
cess to lexico-semantic representations. Furthermore, although
two of the patients showed some residual deficits in phonological
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